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COMPELLING THE COURTS TO QUESTION GONZALES V 0
CENTRO: A PUBLIC HARMS APPROACH TO FREE EXERCISE
ANALYSIS
Ari B. Fontecchio*

INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court's decision in Gonzales v. 0 Centro1 created a
stronger free exercise argument for religious exemptions by elevating the
level of scrutiny courts use to evaluate whether the government's interest is
"compelling. '2 In 0 Centro, the Court created an exemption for 130
religious users of a hallucinogenic, Schedule I drug by rejecting the
government's three compelling interests in preventing its use for the greater
good of society. 3 To arrive at this conclusion, the Court fashioned a new
compelling interest test: The government must show that its interest is
compelling as applied to the religious user--"to the person"-whose
sincere exercise of religion is at stake. 4 By elevating the individual
ramifications over an exemption's societal impact, the Court magnified the
free exercise safe harbor for illegal, dangerous, and burdensome activity

* Editor-in-Chief, CardozoLaw Review. J.D. 2010, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law.
Thanks to Professor Marci Hamilton for her encouragement and direction. Any mistakes are my
own.
1. Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006).
2. Aaron D. Bieber, ConstitutionalLaw: The Supreme Court Can't Have it Both Ways Under
RFRA: The Tale of Two Compelling Interest Tests. Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficiente
Uniao do Vegetal, 126 S. CT 1211 (2006), 7 WYo. L. REv. 225, 227 (2007).
3. 0 Centro, 546 U.S. at 418-19.
4. Id. at 420.
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under not only The Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) (at issue in
0 Centro) but also under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized

Persons Act (RLUIPA).

5

Based on a survey of the 130 "compelling interest" cases decided by the
federal courts of appeal before 6 and after7 0 Centro, this Article examines
how the Supreme Court's 2006 decision has impacted the "compelling
interest" inquiry in lower courts.
The raw data suggests that the
government had a 17.4% chance of losing its compelling interest argument
before 0 Centro and a 35.7% chance of losing after 0 Centro.8 Therefore,

despite notions that 0 Centro is easily avoidable by courts who want to find
a compelling interest, 9 the Supreme Court's holding in 0 Centro creates a
greater chance that lower courts will reject the government's compelling
interest argument and create exemptions in the RFRA and RLUIPA
contexts, subjecting society to potentially dangerous and burdensome

practices.
Part I will set forth the analytical framework established by the Supreme
Court in the RFRA and RLUIPA contexts before 0 Centro.1" This Part will
provide a brief background to RFRA and RLUIPA and set forth the
definition of "compelling interest" before 0 Centro. Part II will focus on
the decision in 0 Centro; specifically, how the Supreme Court's

redefinition of "compelling interest" significantly elevates the government's
burden. Part III will compare the government's chance of winning on a

"compelling interest" argument before 0 Centro1" with the chance of
winning in its wake.

This Part will discuss the merits, flaws, and

5. See, e.g., Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, (Mamaroneck I), 504 F.3d 338 (2d
Cir. 2007) (following 0 Centro to permit a religious school to expand despite violating town
ordinances in the RLUIPA context).
6. The pre-O Centro cases considered in this survey span from the Supreme Court's 1963
decision in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (introducing the compelling interest test in the
free exercise context) through the Court's 2007 decision in 0 Centro. Part III infra discusses the
methodology of this survey.
7. The survey is current through March 3, 2010.
8. The merits, flaws, methodology, and analysis related to this study are discussed in Part III
supra.
9. Matthew Nicholson, Is 0 Centro a Sign ofHopefor RFRA Claimants,95 VA. L. REv. 1281,
1282 (2009).
10. A court's analysis under the language of RFRA and RLUIPA is substantially similar because
the critical language Congress used in both statutes-"substantial burden" and "compelling
interest"-derives from existing jurisprudence under the Free Exercise Clause. See infra Part IV.
A-B; see also Roman P. Storzer, The Perspective of the Religious Land Use Applicant, in
RLUIPA READER: RELIGIOUS LAND USES, ZONING, AND THE COURTS 46 (Michael S. Giaimo &
Lora A. Lucero eds, 2009) (discussing the "struggle between Congress and the Supreme Court"
that resulted in the passage of RFRA and RLUIPA, which were meant to reinstate strict scrutiny
analysis).
11. Id.
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methodology of the case survey at the core of this Article, and will
conclude that outside the prison context the government has little chance of

satisfying its burden. Finally, this Article will propose that courts should
use the fact-specific, person-specific inquiry used in 0 Centro in
conjunction with the more general, public-protecting compelling interest
test used in United States v. Lee, 12 Hernandez v. Commissioner of Internal
14
Revenue, 13 and Braunfield v. Brown.

I. LEGAL BACKGROUND: THE FREE EXERCISE FRAMEWORK
A. Reaching the "Compelling Interest" Inquiry in the RFRA and RLUIPA
Contexts
The Free Exercise Clause forbids laws "prohibiting the free exercise" of
religion. 15 Under this prohibition, the government may not burden one's
ability to engage in religious practices. 16 Where a court finds the

government has "substantially burdened" an individual's ability to practice
his or her religion,17 the burdens of proof and persuasion shift to the
government to justify its rationale for creating the law.18 Depending on the
context of the plaintiffs initial claim, the court will accept or reject the
government's rationale, finding for the government or the individual,

respectively. Three key factors determine the context of the claim: (1)
whether the plaintiff's claim is based on the federal Constitution or a state's
constitution; (2) whether the claim is under a state statute (state RFRA) or a
federal one (RFRA or RLUIPA); and (3) whether the defendant is the
12. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 258 (1981) (accepting the government's compelling
interest argument that a religious exception to the obligation to pay into the Social Security system
jeopardized its ability to help the public).
13. Hernandez v. Commissioner of internal Revenue, 490 U.S. 680, 689-700 (1989) (following
Lee, 455 U.S. at 252).
14. Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 609 (1961) (accepting the government's compelling
interest argument that a religious exception to the Sunday closing laws would put claimants at an
unfair economic advantage over business that had to close).
15. U.S. Const. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ... ").
16. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Vemer, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963) (setting forth the strict scrutiny test in
the free exercise context).
17. "The plaintiff bears the burden of persuading the court that a 'substantial burden' exists."
Michael S. Giaimo, RLUIPA in the Courts, in RLUIPA READER: RELIGIOUS LAND USES,
ZONING, AND THE COURTS 89 (Michael S. Giaimo & Lora A. Lucero eds., 2009).
18. Id. ("[S]ome courts seem to have blurred the line between the 'substantial burden' inquiry and
the analytically separate question of whether a 'substantial burden,' once found, can be justified as
furthering a compelling governmental interest by the least restrictive means.").
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federal or a local government. This Article will focus on RFRA claims
against the federal government and RLUIPA claims against the federal and
local governments.

Where the federal government creates the substantial burden, and the
plaintiff makes a RFRA claim, the court reviews the law with strict
scrutiny, 19 which can only be overcome if the government provides
sufficient evidence that the burdensome law is the least restrictive means of
achieving a "compelling interest. '20 Notably, this framework does not
apply to laws drafted by state and local governments, unless there is a state
RFRA. 2 1

Where the federal, state, or local government creates a substantial burden
on one's free exercise of religion in the land use or prison context, the
Plaintiff may also bring a claim under RLUIPA. 22 In this context, where
the plaintiff demonstrates a substantial burden, the burden (as in the RFRA

context) shifts to the government to demonstrate that the burdensome law
was "the least restrictive means of furthering [the] compelling
'23
governmental interest.
This Article's central focus is on comparing the results of compelling
interest tests before and after the Supreme Court's decision in 0 Centro.
Before 0 Centro, the Supreme Court suggested a compelling interest was
an interest of the highest order. 24 The question after 0 Centro is whether

the highest order is insurmountable in practice.

19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (2006) ("The purposes of this chapter are (1) to restore the
compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbertv. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of
religion is substantially burdened .....
20. § 200bb(a)(1).
21. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2006).
23. § 2000cc(l)(a)-(b); see also Roman P. Storzer, The Perspective of the Religious Land Use
Applicant, in RLUIPA READER: RELIGIOUS LAND USES, ZONING, AND THE COURTS 46 (Michael
S. Giaimo & Lora A. Lucero eds., 2009) ("RLUIPA was meant to be, among other things, a
'visual aid' of existing constitutional protections for churches, municipal officials, and courts,
setting out legal rights derived from free exercise, free speech, equal protection, and due process
principles.").
24. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993).
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B. The Compelling Interest Inquiry Before 0 Centro: A Public Harms
Approach
In a substantial line of pre-RFRA cases, the Supreme Court used a public
harms analysis, which considered how much harm a particular religious
exemption might have on the non-exempted public. This line of cases
reflects the "no-harm principle," which has undergirded the American legal
system since its inception. The no-harm principle was articulated by John
Locke in the 17th century,25 was "stamped on [the] political consciousness"
of the framing generation in the 18th century, 26 became entrenched in
modem law by John Stuart Mill in the 19th century, and remains the
27
dominant justification for criminal, tort, and regulatory laws today.
In this pre-RFRA line of cases, where the potential for public harm was
minimal, the challenger's free exercise argument would prevail, and the
Court would grant the exemption. Where the potential was great, the
government's interest would prevail, and the Court would reject the
exemption. The effect of this analysis was to protect religious beliefs, but
only to the extent such protection would not disproportionately harm
everyone else. The following cases provide examples of how a public
harms analysis properly protected religious interests and public interests.
In Braunfieldv. Brown the Supreme Court held that Sunday closing laws
in Pennsylvania were constitutional. 2 The Court's rejection was based on
the wide range of religious beliefs in the United States, "a cosmopolitan
nation made up of people of almost every conceivable religious
preference. '29 Granting an exemption to one religious group (Orthodox
Jews) would have required the Court to grant exemptions to all religious

25. MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAW 260 (2005).

26. Id.at200.
Obviously, Jefferson and Madison envisioned the potential for great harm to the public

good when a religious entity abuses power. For this reason, absolute liberty for religious
organizations was never contemplated by them, or their fellow citizens. In fact, the
primary assumption at the Constitutional Convention-and it is the most important
principle that has contributed to the Constitution's success-was that every individual
and every institution holding power was likely to abuse that power and therefore must be
checked.
Id. at 261-62.
27. Id. at 260.
28. Braunfield,366 U.S. at 609. In this case, Orthodox Jews, who already had to close on
Saturdays due to their observance of the Sabbath, argued that Sunday closing laws mandated two
days without business. To compete with non-Jewish businesses, Orthodox business owners would
have to open on Saturdays, a violation of their free exercise of religion. The Court rejected this
argument, suggesting that the general public needed a day of rest, and that eliminating it would
have disadvantaged those who had built their businesses around having Sundays off. Id.
29. Id.at 606.
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groups, eroding the state's ability to regulate business activity in the
aggregate.
In subsequent cases, the Court continued to consider the
aggregate effect of exemptions, and in turn, the effect it would have on the
state's ability to regulate in the public interest.
In United States v. Lee, the Supreme Court held that there was an
"overriding governmental interest" in having employers pay into the social
security system. 30 The Court rejected an employer's free exercise argument
that his Amish beliefs forbade such payments. As in Braunfield,the Court
framed its rejection of the employer's argument in terms of the harmful
collateral effects such exemptions would have on the public: "To maintain
an organized society that guarantees religious freedom to a great variety of
'31
faiths requires that some religious practices yield to the common good.
The Court continued to consider a religious exemption's effect on the
public in Hernandez v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. 32 Following
United States v. Lee, the Court reasoned that providing tax deductions to
one religious group (Scientologists) would require granting similar
deductions to all religious groups. 33 In the end, this would reduce the
government's ability to administer a system whose purpose was to increase
public good.
The case of Employment Division v. Smith34 provides an even starker
example of the Court's interest in protecting the public from collateral
harms caused by religious exemptions. In Smith, the Court extended its
public harms analysis to the criminal context, holding that the government
does not have to show a "compelling interest" to justify regulatory laws so
long as they are "neutral" and "generally applicable. '35 Specifically, the
Court held that the state unemployment office did not violate the Free
Exercise Clause when it denied benefits to drug rehabilitation workers who
were fired for their religious use of peyote, a "Schedule I controlled

30. Lee, 455 U.S. at 258. The Court reasoned:
[T]he social security system is nationwide, the governmental interest is apparent. The
social security system in the United States serves the public interest by providing a
comprehensive insurance system with a variety of benefits available to all
participants ....This mandatory participation is indispensable to the fiscal vitality of the

social security system.
Id.

31. Id. at 259 (emphasis added).
32. Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 686.
33. In Hernandez, Scientologists claimed that they should be exempt from paying taxes on

income based on "auditing" sessions intended to "increase members' spiritual awareness." Id. at
692.
34. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).

35. Id.
at 886, n.3.
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substance. ' 36 The Court echoed this language in Lukumi v. City of Hialeah,
strengthening "the general proposition that a law that is neutral and of
general applicability need not be justified by a compelling governmental
interest even if the law has the incidental effect of burdening a particular
religious practice. '37 Lukumi's significance is that it provides a clear
example of how the public-protection rationale in Smith and other pre38
RFRA cases also leaves room for the protection of religious practices.
In 1993 Congress enacted RFRA, overruling Smith and explicitly
reinstating the requirement that the government demonstrate a "compelling
'39
interest.. .where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened.
Despite the Court's subsequent holding that RFRA is unconstitutional as
applied to the states, 40 a number of states have enacted state RFRAs
reintroducing the compelling interest inquiry. Additionally, RLUIPA
(applicable at the federal and the state level) requires a compelling interest
where a court finds that the government has substantially burdened the free
exercise of religion with prison rules or zoning laws. 41 Finally, in 2006, the
Supreme Court confirmed the vitality of the compelling interest inquiry in
42
the post-RFRA era, elevating the requirement to new heights.

II. THE COMPELLING INTEREST INQUIRY AFTER 0 CENTRO
In Gonzales v. 0 Centro 130 members of a Brazilian Christian Spiritist
sect raised a Free Exercise defense to a customs agent's seizure of hoasca, a
Schedule I hallucinogenic. 43 The religious group (UDV) had made fourteen
prior shipments, and argued that the seizure violated RFRA, because
members of UDV used hoasca to brew sacramental tea, and the

36. Id. at 904. Justice O'Connor explains the importance of a Schedule I classification as follows:
"Congress has found that [the substance] has a high potential for abuse, that there is no currently
accepted medical use, and that there is a lack of accepted safety for use of the drug under medical
supervision." Id.
37. Church of the Lukumi BabaluAye, 508 U.S. at 531.
38. See id.at 535. In this case, the Court found the city council's reaction to a request to build a
Santeria church was unconstitutional. When the city council learned of the Santeria church
members' request, it adopted a resolution prohibiting animal sacrifice, the central feature of the
Santeria religion. Evaluating the entire record, the Court found that the city council had
impermissibly targeted the Santeria faith, unconstitutionally burdening its free exercise of religion.
Id.
39. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (2006).
40. Flores, 521 U.S. at 533.
41. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-i (2006).
42. 0 Centro, 546 U.S. 418 (2006).
43. Id. at 425.
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government's seizure substantially burdened UDV's sincere exercise of
religion. Conceding substantial burden, the government advanced three
compelling interests justifying the seizure: first, protecting the health and
safety of UDV members; second, preventing the diversion of hoasca from
UDV members to non-religious users; and third, compliance with the 1971
United Nations Convention on Psychotropic Substances, signed by the
United States. 44 The District Court rejected all three of the government's
compelling interest arguments and the Tenth Circuit and Supreme Court
affirmed, upholding UDV's injunction against the government's seizure of
three drums of UDV's illegally imported Schedule I Controlled Substance.
In its analysis, the Supreme Court recognized that the hallucinogenic
substance in hoasca is "exceptionally dangerous, '45 yet the government had
not satisfied its burden of proving that hoasca would harm the particular
people at issue, namely members of UDV using hoasca for religious
purposes:
RFRA requires the Government to demonstrate that the compelling
interest test is satisfied through application of the challenged law
"to the person"--the particular claimant whose sincere exercise of
religion is being substantially burdened.... [T]his Court look[s]
beyond broadly formulated interests justifying the general
applicability of government mandates and scrutinize[s] the asserted
harm of granting specific exemptions to particular religious
46
claimants.
Where, as in 0 Centro, the government's evidence of harm is "in
equipoise" with evidence demonstrating a lack of harm to religious users,
47
the compelling interest argument fails.
Weighing the evidence presented at trial, the Court focused on the
government's first two compelling interest arguments: (1) health risks and
(2) the potential for diversion. The government presented evidence that
hoasca can cause "psychotic reactions, cardiac irregularities, and adverse
drug interactions.''48 UDV cited studies demonstrating the safety of
hoasca's sacramentaluse. As for diversion, the government noted a "rise
in the illicit use of hallucinogens, and.. .the illegal use of hoasca in
particular. '49 UDV argued that the market for hoasca was small, the church

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id.at 426.
Id.at 432.
Id. at 430-31 (emphasis added).
Id. at 426.
Id.at 426.
Id.
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only imported small amounts of the drug, and there had been no problem
with diversion in the past. The Supreme Court then affirmed the District
Court's decision where the evidence regarding health risks was "in
equipoise" and the evidence of diversion was "virtually balanced." Finally,
the Supreme Court agreed that "[i]n the face of such an even showing,
the.. .Government had failed to demonstrate a compelling interest"50
After 0 Centro a court must determine whether the government has a
compelling interest in applying its burdensome law "to the person, ' 51 the
religious user at issue. This focused analysis constrains courts to look
narrowly at the religious user, losing the ability to evaluate the collateral
consequences of religious exemptions. In turn, this expands the religious
safe harbor for dangerous or illegal activity that burdens the public.

III. WINNING A COMPELLING INTEREST ARGUMENT
BEFORE AND AFTER 0 CENTRO

This Part compares the government's ability to win a compelling interest
argument before and after 0 Centro.52 The vehicle for this comparison is
an examination of all the "compelling interest" cases 53 decided by the
Supreme Court and the federal courts of appeal since the Supreme Court's
decision in Sherbert v. Verner.54 For the purposes of drawing a direct
comparison, this study draws a line between pre-O Centro cases (Appendix
I, infra) and post-O Centro cases (Appendix II, infra).55 The study then

50. Id. at 427.
51. Id. at 423.

52. Viewed more narrowly, the specific purpose of this study is to determine whether courts citing
0 Centro are more likely to reject the government's compelling interest argument than courts
were before the 0 Centro decision.
53. For the purposes of this study, a "compelling interest" case (an "on point" case) is one in
which the court either (1) reaches the merits of the government's compelling interest argument,
accepting or rejecting it or (2) states explicitly in dicta that the court would recognize the
government's proffered compelling interest had the government's case not failed for some other
reason.
54. 374 U.S. at 403 (holding that under the Free Exercise Clause the government must
demonstrate a compelling interest before denying unemployment compensation to an employee
fired when her religious beliefs conflicted with her job).
55. This study is current through March, 2010. Its results are based on Lexis and Westlaw
searches. To generate the list of pre-O Centro cases, the Lexis search terms were as follows:
court(supreme or circuit) and "free exercise" and (substant! w/2 burden!) and (compelling w/2
interest) and relig!. Then, the search was restricted to cases decided between June 16, 1963 (the
date of the Supreme Court's decision in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Feb. 21,
2006 (the date of the Supreme Court's decision in Gonzales v. 0 Centro EspiritaBeneficente

Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006)). The search returned 96 results. The first relevant case,
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compares the likelihood of a court's acceptance of the government's
compelling interest argument in both groups of cases (Appendix III, infra).

Based on a raw percentage of all the compelling interest cases, pre-O
Centro courts rejected the government's compelling interest 17.4% of the
time, 6 while post-O Centro courts rejected the government's compelling
interest 35.7% of the time.5 7 To account for the fact that courts routinely
accept the government's compelling interest argument in the prison context,
the study generated separate non-prison statistics. Pre-O Centro courts

rejected the government's compelling interest arguments outside the prison
context 25.9% of the time.5 8
Post-O Centro courts rejected the
government's compelling interest arguments outside the prison context
50.0% of the time.5 9 While a number of factors call these statistics into
question, 60 the numbers provide evidence (indeed, the only evidence

UnitedStates v. Dickens, 695 F.2d 765 (3rd Cir. 1982) was decided on Dec. 15, 1982, nineteen
years after Sherbert. Only these 96 cases were considered as part of this study, and only cases that
highlighted the compelling interest issue in some way were included in the calculations. More
specifically, Appendix I contains only cases in which the court either reached the merits of the
government's compelling interest argument or explicitly accepted or rejected the proffered
compelling interest in dicta. Especially in some of the earlier cases, where courts were more
likely to blur or combine the compelling interest and least restrictive means inquiries, courts held
in dicta that they accepted the interest as compelling, but that the government still failed on its
"compelling interest argument" (based on a least restrictive means analysis). See generally Jolly
v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468 (2nd Cir. 1996); Hartmann v. Stone, 68 F.3d 973 (6th Cir. 1995). Such
cases are marked as "dicta" in Appendix I infra. The post-O Centro cases were generated by
Shepardizing the 0 Centro decision through March 3, 2010. The survey then considered all cases
that followed or distinguished 0 Centro, counting only federal decisions (thirty-four cases).
Notably, these thirty-four cases also contain decisions from the District Courts. The reason for
this inclusion was to get a strong base of comparison. Of course, as the federal appeals courts
decide more compelling interest cases, this sample size will increase. Finally, the pre- and post-O
Centro cases were separated, analyzed, and compared.
56. In this pre-O Centro category, there were forty-six on point cases. See supranote 55. Eight
of the on point cases rejected the government's compelling interest arguments. Thirty-seven cases
accepted the argument, and one case found the compelling interest argument neutral.
57. In this post-O Centro category, there were fourteen on point cases. Seven cases rejected the
government's compelling interest arguments. Eleven accepted the government's compelling
interest argument, and one case was neutral.
58. Ten pre-O Centro non-prison cases were on point. Courts accepted the government's
argument in seven cases and rejected the government's argument in three. See infra Appendix I.
59. Thirteen post-O Centro non-prison cases were on point. Courts accepted the government's
argument in nine cases and rejected the government's argument in five. See infra Appendix II.
60. A list of the study's potential flaws is as follows: The sample size was low, especially in the
post-O Centro cases. This was a realistic limitation, however, based on the sheer number of times
0 Centro has been cited. The study did not account for post-O Centro cases accepting or rejecting
compelling interest arguments without citing 0 Centro. The reason for this is that the study's goal
was to test how 0 Centro has affected courts that are faithful to its precedent. Additionally, the
numbers might be skewed because the facts and holding in the 0 Centro case itself might have
energized potential religious claimants to engage in risky behavior to test the bounds of this new
precedent. The existence of this statistical flaw, however, might actually serve to support the
Article's central claim of public harms to the extent the holding in 0 Centro has directly caused
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available) that the government is less likely to win its compelling interest
argument after 0 Centro.
In addition to the raw numbers, this study generated three significant and
substantive observations by analyzing trends in the cases themselves. First,
0 Centro has had an insignificant impact on the government's chance of
prevailing on its compelling interest argument in the prison context.
Second, in a pair of instances where different iterations of the same case
were decided before and after 0 Centro, different decisions resulted on the
same facts. For example, in the cases of Westchester Day School v.
62
Mamaroneck61 and Navajo Nation v. United States Forest Services,
appellate decisions after 0 Centro rejected the same compelling interest
arguments that were accepted before 0 Centro. Third, in Schedule I drug
cases, clear instances where public harms are at stake, it is more likely that
courts will reject the government's compelling interest argument after 0
Centro.

A. The Prison Context
As the Supreme Court noted in Cutter v. Wilkinson, in a compelling
interest analysis, "context matters. '63 In the prison context, courts before
and after 0 Centro routinely accept the government's compelling interest
arguments related to the health and safety of prison guards and inmates.
Justice Ginsburg, writing for a unanimous court in Cutter, explained that
prison authorities typically act on compelling interests and that courts
entertaining RLUIPA claims should accord "due deference to the
'64
experience and expertise of prison and jail administrators.

parties seeking religious exemptions to test how much they can get away with. Finally, the pre-O
Centro cases did not include district court cases, but the post-O Centro cases did. This was based
on logistical necessity and to get a better sense of the actual percentages. This survey leaves open
the potential for two additional avenues of exploration: (1) surveying the numerous cases in the
district courts before 0 Centro and (2) surveying the thousands of state court cases before and
after 0 Centro.
61. Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. ofMamaroneck, (MamaroneckI), 504 F.3d 338, 353 (2d Cir.
2007).
62. Navajo Nation v. United States Forest Serv., 408 F. Supp. 2d 866, 900 (D. Ariz. 2006).
63. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 722-23 (2005).
64. Id.at 717 (quoting 146 CoNG. REc. 16698 (2000) (joint statement of Sen. Hatch and Sen.
Kennedy on RLUIPA)). The Senators comments included:
Lawmakers supporting RLUIPA were mindful of the urgency of discipline, order,
safety, and security in penal institutions ....They anticipated that courts would apply
the [RLUIPA] standard with "due deference to the experience and expertise of prison
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This survey revealed that lower courts have faithfully employed the
deferential dictates of Cutter. In fact, this survey revealed nearly
unanimous results in the nineteen pre-O Centro prison cases where courts
accepted that prison safety was a compelling interest.65 Additionally, courts
in four of the five post-O Centro prison cases accepted the government's
compelling interest arguments. 66 In the relatively rare cases where the
government lost in the prison context, courts typically did accept the
compelling interest argument, but they held that the prison could have
achieved its compelling interest in a manner less restrictive of the prisoner's
free exercise of religion. 67 In one pre-O Centro case, for example, a court
found that the warden could have achieved prison safety in a manner less
restrictive of a Native American inmate's free exercise rights than by
68
enacting an outright prohibition against the possession of prayer feathers.
This case demonstrates that where courts find the government has
violated a person's free exercise rights, the court can accept the
government's compelling interest argument and still hold for the religious
party. Indeed, the less restrictive means prong of the analysis is a sharper
and narrower tool than the compelling interest prong. The less restrictive
means prong allows the court to create a narrow holding based on the facts
at hand. In contrast, where a court--especially the Supreme Court-rejects
a compelling interest argument, it does so categorically, eliminating the
argument in all subsequent cases, paving the way for public harms.

The next cases demonstrate that 0 Centro has caused some courts to reevaluate the same facts, creating categorical rejections of compelling
interest arguments accepted before 0 Centro.

and jail administrators in establishing necessary regulations and procedures to maintain
good order, security and discipline ....
"
Id. at 723 (quoting 139 CONG. REC. 26190 (1993) (statement of Sen. Hatch)).
65. In eighteen of the nineteen pre-O Centro prison cases courts accepted the government's
compelling interest arguments. See infra Appendix I.
66. Id.
67. This "least restrictive means" prong of the strict scrutiny analysis is outside the scope of this
Article. However, for a pre-O Centro example, see Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989 (9th
Cir. 2005) (finding prison safety is "clearly" a compelling interest). For a post-O Centro example,
see Borzych v. Frank,439 F.3d 388, 390-91 (7th Cir. 2006) and Raglandv. Angelone, 420 F.
Supp. 2d 507, 515-17 (D. Va. 2006).
68. Wolfe v. Ferguson, No. 04-5177, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40978 (W.D. Ark. Sept. 8, 2005).
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B. Different Determinations on the Same Facts
In Navajo Nation v. UnitedStates ForestServices a pre-O Centro district
court found compelling the government's interest in public safety on
government land.69 Then, the members of the post-O Centro appellate court
who reached the government's compelling interest argument (albeit, the
dissenters) followed 0 Centro, and rejected the government's argument as a
mere general interest in public safety.
More specifically, in Navajo Nation the District of Arizona held that the
government had a compelling interest in improving the safety of a public
skiing facility by preventing overcrowding. The Forest Service's method of
alleviating this risk was to blow man-made snow containing small amounts
of human waste onto state-owned peaks worshipped by Native Americans.
Despite the substantial burden this placed on the free exercise rights of
Native Americans who worshipped the mountains, the court held, "the
Forest Service has a compelling interest in authorizing upgrades at
Snowbowl to ensure that users of the National Forest ski area have a safe
experience. '70 Plaintiffs then appealed, and the case reached the Ninth
Circuit shortly after the Supreme Court's decision in 0 Centro.
Notably, the majority held for the government on the grounds that the
safety measures failed to substantially burden the Native Americans' free
exercise rights.71 As such, the majority failed to reach the compelling
interest inquiry. However, the dissent provides a window into the Ninth
Circuit's post-O Centro treatment of a public harms rationale. Citing 0
Centro, Judges Fletcher, Pregerson, and Fisher stated that they would have
held that none of the government's interests in public safety were
compelling.
Echoing 0 Centro's rejection of "broadly formulated
interests," the judges rejected the government's "general interest in ensuring
'72
public safety.
To be sure, the significance of this observation is questionable because
the appellate judge's job is to scrutinize the legal analysis of the court
below; further, the post-0 Centro 'about face' only involved three

69. Navajo Nation, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 873.
70. Id. at 906.
71. Navajo Nation v. United States Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1069 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc)
("Of course, the 'compelling interest test' ... applies only if there is a substantial burden on the
free exercise of religion ....
[T]he government is not required to prove a compelling interest for
its action... unless the plaintiff first proves the government action substantially burdens his
exercise of religion."). The majority went on to find there was no substantial burden. Id. at 1078.
72. Id. at 1107 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
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dissenting members of the court. Still, an explicit rejection of the public
harms rationale in the wake of 0 Centro by members of the Ninth Circuit
suggests that 0 Centro's effect is not merely conjectural. Indeed in the
following case, 0 Centro caused a court to change its minds on a second
determination of the same facts.
In the pre-O Centro version of Westchester Day School. v. Village of
Mamaroneck,73 the Second Circuit expressly held open the possibility of
accepting the government's compelling interest argument. 74 After 0
Centro, the Second Circuit explicitly rejected the government's compelling
interest, holding for the religious entity. 75 Underlying both determinations
was a village board's denial of a Jewish day school's application to
renovate old buildings and build new ones. 76 The denial was based on the
board's determination that the new buildings would increase traffic and
reduce the town's ability to ensure safe streets.
Pre-0 Centro, the Second Circuit reserved judgment on the
government's compelling interest determination, suggesting, "[w]e know of
no controlling authority, either in the Supreme Court or any circuit holding
'77
that traffic problems are incapable of being deemed compelling.
Additionally, the court stated, "[w]hile it is true that there are no
authoritative cases holding that a traffic concern satisfies the 'compelling
interest' test, nor are there authoritative cases holding that a traffic concern
cannot satisfy the test. ' 78 Based on insufficient findings in the record, the
79
Second Circuit remanded the case to the trial court.
In the second appeal, which occurred after 0 Centro, the Second Circuit
reached the merits of the state's compelling interest argument and rejected
it, holding for the religious entity. 80 It is of course significant that on
remand the trial court questioned the sufficiency of the evidence supporting
the state's traffic safety argument and found instead that the board had

73. Mamaroneck1, 504 F.3d at 353 (citing 0 Centro and holding that traffic safety is not a
compelling government interest). But see MamaroneckI, 386 F.3d at 191.
74. Mamaroneck], 386 F.3d at 191.
75. Mamaroneck1, 504 F.3d at 353.
76. Mamaroneckl, 386 F.3d at 185.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 192.
80. Mamaroneckl, 504 F.3d at 353 ("The district court's findings reveal the ZBA's stated
reasons for denying the application were not substantiated by evidence in the record before it. The
court stated the application was denied not because of a compelling governmental interest that
would adversely impact public health, safety, or welfare, but was denied because of undue
deference to the opposition of a small group of neighbors.").
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simply deferred to the complaints of a small group of town residents. 81 This
might lead to the conclusion that the Second Circuit would have accepted
the state's compelling interest argument had the evidence of traffic danger
been more compelling. Additionally, this observation might lead to the
conclusion that the Second Circuit ultimately did not reject the
government's compelling interest at all; the court merely affirmed the trial
court's determination that the record contained insufficient evidence that
82
traffic safety was a compelling problem.
However, this reading of the case sequence would undercut 0 Centro's
constraining influence and its compulsion toward finding for the religious
entity. Here, the Second Circuit, cited 0 Centro for the proposition that the
government "must show a compelling interest in imposing the burden on
religious exercise in the particularcase at hand, not a compelling interest
in general. '83 Under this logic, the Second Circuit would reject the town's
compelling interest argument even where every religious entity in
Mamaroneck built new assembly halls at the same time, clogging every
street in town. In such a case, the town could not argue that it had an
interest in constraining any particular religious entity, and it would be
powerless to police what certainly would be an affront to public safety and
town order.
The observations in the Navajo Nation and Mamaroneck cases
demonstrate the constraining influence of 0 Centro even on courts dealing
with the same facts before and after the Supreme Court's decision. After 0
Centro, a court is nearly powerless to accept an argument that posits the
harmful effect of religious activity in the aggregate.

81. On remand, the trial court found that the project did have an "incremental impact" on traffic,
but that the town could have alleviated such impact in a means less restrictive than denying the
school's building permit. Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 417 F. Supp. 2d 477,
553 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). Additionally, one trial expert suggested, "I don't believe that traffic volume
in and of itself represents a threat to safety," and further findings suggested that "despite
community complaints about existing traffic... as well as the... existing congestion... there is
no evidence that the Town has sought to mitigate this concern at any time during the period of
almost three years since the Application was denied." Id. at 533, 552.
82. Indeed, the Second Circuit stated: "The district court's findings reveal the.., stated reasons
for denying the application were not substantiated by evidence in the record before it."
MamaroneckII,
504 F.3d at 353.
83. Id. at 353 (emphasis added).
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C. Drug Cases: Different Determinations on Analogous Facts
A comparison between pre- and post-O Centro cases involving Schedule
I substances provides direct evidence that 0 Centro has made it more
difficult for the government to police the use, importation, and distribution
of substances that can harm the public.
The following cases are examples of the courts' general acceptance of
compelling interest arguments related to Schedule I substances before 0
Centro. Significantly, both cases were decided in the post-RFRA era,
marked by a high level of deference to religion. Still, in both cases, the
courts suggested that where drugs are concerned, it goes without saying that
the government has a compelling interest in protecting the public.
In United States v. Israel, the Seventh Circuit held, "[w]hether the
government has a compelling interest in preventing drug abuse can hardly
be disputed. ' 84 The court rejected a Rastafarian's RFRA challenge to the
revocation of his supervised release for smoking marijuana "all day every
day, ' 85 reasoning that the government had a compelling interest in "the
uniform enforcement of drug laws to prevent harm to the public health and
safety. '86 The court found that drug use was a serious threat to that
interest.8 7 Similarly, in Loop v. United States, the District of Minnesota
held that "the government has a compelling interest in the uniform
enforcement of drug laws to prevent harm to the public health and safety,"
rejecting the plaintiffs challenge to the seizure of a "one hitter" marijuana
88
pipe as he entered a public courthouse.
Then in 0 Centro in 2006, the Supreme Court took this obvious,
longstanding, and intuitively compelling interest off the table, forcing
courts to do one of two things: Maneuver around 0 Centro to achieve
intuitive results consistent with long-standing precedent, or follow 0
Centro to illogical outcomes. Two post-O Centro Schedule I cases
exemplify these two approaches.
United States v. Lepp, decided shortly after 0 Centro, provides an
example of the former approach. 89 In Lepp, the Northern District of
California rejected a Rastafarian's RFRA challenge to the search warrant

84. United States v. Israel, 317 F.3d 768, 771 (7th Cir. 2003).
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id.at 772.
Id.at 771.
Id.at 772.
Loop v.United States, No. 05-575, 2006 WL 1851140 at *7 (D. Minn. June 30, 2006).

89. United States v. Lepp, No. 04-0317, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66311 (N.D.Cal. Sept. 6, 2007).
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used to seize over 32,000 marijuana plants, holding that the government has
a compelling interest in "enforcing drug laws by executing valid search
The court
warrants in pursuit of that.. .long-established [aim]."90
distinguished 0 Centro in two ways. First, the court concluded that 0
Centro was a "narrow tailoring" case, diminishing the importance of 0
Centro's compelling interest reasoning.
Second, the district court
distinguished peyote and hoasca from marijuana, 91 suggesting the Attorney
General has not granted religious exemptions for marijuana. Only by
nimbly dodging the language and reasoning in 0 Centro was the district
court able to achieve the intuitive result, upholding the conviction of a drug
dealer.
Church of the Holy Light of the Queen v. Mukasey provides an example
where a district court's adherence to 0 Centro led further down the slippery
slope toward public harm; a slippery slope whose existence the Supreme
Court has denied. 92 In Church of the Holy Light, the District of Oregon
awarded members of the Daime Church an exemption for the religious use
of Daime tea (containing the same active ingredient DMT at issue in 0
Centro).93 As in 0 Centro, the district court rejected the government's

compelling interest arguments in preventing health risks to religious users,
preventing health risks to others who drink Daime tea, preventing diversion
of Daime tea to non-religious users, and ensuring the DEA's general ability
to regulate pursuant to the Controlled Substances Act.94 More importantly,
the court rejected these arguments despite additional evidence not before
the court in 0 Centro.
First, the district court found that federal agents confiscated "an
unspecified amount of marijuana" and "a small amount of bufotenine, a
hallucinogenic drug derived from animal secretions" at the church leader's
96
home. 95 Second, church leaders were in charge of distributing Daime tea.
Third, a small number of church members stated that they occasionally
smoked marijuana and were trying to quit.97 Fourth, the court recognized

that there was a "small risk" that Daime tea could cause a "transient
psychotic episode" and a "smaller" but still present risk that Daime tea
could cause long-term psychosis. 9 Therefore, despite the fact that a man in
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id.at *9 (emphasis added).
See id.at*10-11.
Church of the Holy Light of the Queen v. Mukasey, 615 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (D. Or. 2009).
Id.at 1219.
Id.at 1220.
Id. at 1213-14 & n.1.
Id. at 1216.
Id.at 1214.
Id.at 1217.
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possession of illegal amounts of other Schedule I substances was in charge
of administering Daime tea to religious users trying to quit their use of other
drugs, and despite the fact that the same man was in charge of safeguarding
the public from the diversion of Daime tea to non-religious users, the
district court held that 0 Centro was directly on point and found for the
religious users.
This line of cases demonstrates not only that 0 Centro compels courts to
make counterintuitive decisions that increase the risk harm, but it also
demonstrates that the reasoning of 0 Centro has no logical outer limit.
Essentially 0 Centro paves a slippery slope whose existence the Supreme
Court refuses to admit. The next Part supports this assertion.
D. Another Potential "Slip"
In 0 Centro, the Court roundly rejected the government's "slipperyslope" argument because RFRA operates by mandating that courts evaluate
each claimed exception to rules of general applicability,99 and because
courts are more than competent to apply the compelling interest standard
properly. 100 The problem, however, is that the 0 Centro opinion compels
courts to engage in an inherently biased, pro-plaintiff analysis. Instead of
allowing courts to engage in a balanced analysis on a case-by-case basis, 0
Centro forces courts to defer to religious exceptions on a case-by-case
basis. 101
Subsequent actions by members of UDV add real world facts to the
government's theoretical slippery slope argument in 0 Centro. Since the
Court's decision, members of UDV have presented Arroyo Hondo, New
Mexico with plans to build an 11,000 square foot, 2.5 acre temple,
including an 800-square-foot greenhouse for growing hoasca, and a fifty-

99. 0 Centro, 546 U.S. at 435-36 ("The Government's argument echoes the classic rejoinder of
bureaucrats throughout history: If I make an exception for you, I'll have to make one for
everybody, so no exceptions. But RFRA operates by mandating consideration, under the
compelling interest test, of exceptions to 'rule[s] of general applicability."').
100. Id. at 436 ("We reaffirmed just last Term the feasibility of case-by-case consideration of
religious exemptions to generally applicable rules.... We had 'no cause to believe' that the
compelling interest test 'would not be applied in an appropriately balanced way' to specific claims
for exemptions as they arose.").
101. Id.
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one space parking area enabling congregants to drive to and from the
temple. 10 2 Currently, the case is not before the courts, but if it were, it
would test the limits of 0 Centro's logic.
Members of UDV would argue that Arroyo Hondo's determination
substantially burdened their free exercise rights, shifting the burden to the
government to argue a compelling interest. The government's main
arguments would be that an 800-square-foot greenhouse would have the
capacity to produce more hoasca than church members would need for
sacramental purposes, thereby increasing the risk of ingesting more hoasca
than they would need to perform the ritual and increasing the risk of
diversion. Next, the government would suggest that a fifty-five car parking
garage would increase the risk that UDV members on sacramental
hallucinogens would get into car accidents, harming themselves as well as
non-church members in the surrounding community.
To begin its analysis, the court would determine whether the potential
harms in this case pose a greater risk to the religious users than in 0 Centro
and Church of the Holy Light of the Queen v. Mukasey. UDV would
analogize the cases, suggesting that the evidence here is also "in equipoise."
Religious leaders would safeguard the homegrown hoasca from the
greenhouse with lock and key preventing overuse, and ceremonial leaders
would prevent religious users from driving until the hallucinogenic effects
wore off. Therefore, UDV members would argue this case poses no greater
harm to religious users, the focal point of the 0 Centro analysis.
Under a faithful reading of 0 Centro, collateral harms to the public are
not the court's primary concern. Under 0 Centro and Church of the Holy
Light, the distinguishing factors of the Arroyo Hondo case-the greenhouse
and the parking garage-would not be sufficiently compelling for a court
faithful to 0 Centro's rationale. In 0 Centro and in Church of the Holy
Light, the courts took judicial notice that there is only a small market for
diverted hoasca in the United States, and that religious users avoid overuse
because it violates the sacrament. Additionally, with ceremonial monitors,
dangers related to hallucinogenic driving are reduced to mere traffic
concerns, questionable as a compelling interest under Westchester Day
School v. Village of Mamaroneck. Therefore, as in the other Schedule I
cases, a court in Arroyo Hondo would either have to follow 0 Centro to its

102. Tom Sharpe, Hoasca-DrinkingGroup Seeks to Build Temple in Arroyo Hondo, THE NEW
MEUCAN (Aug. 27, 2009), available at http://www.santafenewmexican.com/Local%/2ONews/
Hoasca-drinking-group-seeks-to-build-temple-in-Arroyo-Hondo.
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counterintuitive conclusions or engage in judicial gymnastics to generate
the intuitive result. In either case, 0 Centro is in the way, creating a real
risk of public harm.

CONCLUSION AND SOLUTION

This case survey and its observations and analysis demonstrate that the
Court's holding in 0 Centro does, in fact, make the government's burden
unrealistically difficult to satisfy even in the most obvious situations. This
is problematic given the august history of the no-harm principle, which
predates the nation's founding. Therefore, the Supreme Court should
clarify its holding in 0 Centro and return to the long-established no-harm
precedent in United States v. Lee, Hernandez v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, and Braunfield v. Brown. The following proposal demonstrates
how the Court could return to these principles and faithfully apply 0
Centro, making it unnecessary to overrule precedent-new or old.
This Article's proposal is a two-part, either-or compelling interest test,
where a lower court would accept the government's compelling interest
argument if the activity poses a substantial risk of harm to either the
religious user or to the public. In this way, courts would meaningfully
accommodate religious freedom and public safety.
Under part one of this new test, a court would ask whether the activity in
question-hoasca use, a zoning variance, or non-payment of taxes, to name
a few-is likely to harm the religious user. 0 Centro's harm-to-the-user
inquiry would govern this first part of the test. If the court were to find that
the activity is likely to harm the religious user, the court, following 0
Centro, would accept the government's compelling interest in regulating
the activity. If the religious user were able to demonstrate that the activity
is not likely to cause him harm, then the court would move to the second
part of the either-or test. Under part two, a court would ask whether the
religious user's activity is likely to harm the public. United States v. Lee,
Hernandez v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and Braunfield v. Brown
would guide the court in this second inquiry. If the court were to find that
the activity is unlikely to harm the public, then it would reject the
government's compelling interest argument and prohibit regulation,
awarding an exemption to the religious user. If, on the other hand, the court
were to find that the activity is likely to harm the public, then the court
would accept the government's compelling interest argument, and allow the
government to regulate in the area.
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This either-or compelling interest inquiry would not only follow modem
precedent, but it would also accord proper faith to the no-harm rule, which
should remain part of the bedrock of our legal system.

APPENDIX I: COMPELLING INTEREST CASES
10 3
FROM SHERBERT TO 0 CENTRO

SUPREME COURT
Cutter v. Wilkinson,
544 U.S. 709, 723
n. 11 (2005)

Church of Lukumi
Babalu Aye v. City
of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520, 529-30(1993)

Employment Div.,
Dep't of Human
Res. v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872, 876
(1990)
Tex. Monthly, Inc.
v. Bullock, 489 U.S.

Prisoners survive dismissal of free
exercise claim. Dicta suggesting,
Courts...may be expected to
recognize the government's
countervailing compelling interest in
not facilitating inflammatory racist
activity that could imperil prison
security and order."
Santeria religious group's animal
sacrifice

Religious use of peyote

Sales tax exemption for religious
publications

Accepted
Not facilitating
inflammatory racist
activity in prisons

Rejected
(1) Health risk to
participants and public
(2) Emotional injury to
children witnessing the
sacrifice of animals
(3) Protection of animals
from cruel, unnecessary
killing
(4) Restricting slaughter or
sacrifice of animals to
areas zoned for
slaughterhouse use
Accepted
Enforcement of state
controlled substances act
with no exception for
sacramental use
Rejected
Avoiding violations of the

103. The primary source for the results contained in this chart was a Lexis search (Westlaw
returned the same number of results). Its methodology is described supra notes 52-53 and 55.
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Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses
CIRCUIT COURTS

Grace United
Methodist Church v.
City of Cheyenne,
451 F.3d 643, 664
(10th Cir. 2006)

Warsoldier v.
Woodford, 418 F.3d
989, 998 (9th Cir.
2005)
Konikov v. Orange
County, 410 F.3d
1317, 1326 (11th
Cir. 2005)

Benning v. Georgia,
391 F.3d 1299, 1313
(1 th Cir. 2004)
Westchester Day
Sch. v. Vill. of
Mamaroneck, 386
F.3d 183, 190-91
(2d Cir. 2004)

Murphy v. Mo.
Dep't of
Corrections, 372
F.3d 979, 983 (8th
Cir. 2004)
(overruled on other

Permit denied for operation of
religious daycare. Holding on other
grounds, but admitting a letter into
evidence signed by the religious
group that that since the venture was
for business not religion, the
government was justified in denying
the permit due to "its compelling
interest of limiting traffic, noise and
congestion in a residential
neighborhood."
Native American prisoner's challenge
of hair grooming policy succeeds due
to failure on the least restrictive
means prong
Jewish rabbi's RLUIPA challenge to
state ordinance preventing him from
performing religious ceremonies in
his home

Failed challenge to RLUIPA's
constitutionality
See discussion in Part III, supra

White supremacist challenged prison
rules

Accepted (Dicta)
Limiting traffic, noise, and
congestion

Accepted
Prison security is "clearly"
a compelling governmental
interest
Rejected
State's ability to treat
family day care homes
differently from other
groups based on the
fundamental right to
freedom of personal choice
in family life
Accepted (Dicta)
Prison safety
Neutral**
Deliberately avoiding the
question of whether traffic
concerns were a
compelling interest, but
holding open the
possibility that they might
be
** Notably, the same court
rejected traffic concerns as
a compelling interest in a
subsequent decision in the
same case (infra).
Accepted
Prison safety

grounds)
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Frank v. Charles,
No. 04-1674, 2004
U.S. App. LEXIS
11541 (7th Cir. June
3,2004)
Madison v. Riter,
355 F.3d 310, 1321
(4th Cir. 2003)
Charles v.
Verhagen, 348 F.3d
601, 611 (7th Cir.
2003)
United States v.
Antoine, 318 F.3d
919, 924 (9th Cir.
2003)
United States v.
Israel, 317 F.3d 768,
772 (7th Cir. 2003)

Tenafly Eruv Ass'n
v. Borough of
Tenafly, 309 F.3d
144, 172-73 (3rd
Cir. 2002)
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Muslim inmate's challenge to
prison's prohibition against wearing
prayer beads

Accepted
Maintaining security and
suppressing gang activity
in prison

Convict's RLUIPA challenge to not
being served kosher meals

Accepted
Prison safety and security
(dicta)
Accepted
Prison safety and security

Religious inmate's failed challenge of
the prison's refusal to allow him to
possess certain amounts of prayer oil
Native American's RFRA challenge
to his prosecution for violating eagle
hunting ordinance

Accepted
Eagle protection

Unsuccessful RFRA challenge by
Rastafarian parolee on supervised
release to his subsequent
imprisonment for testing positive for
high levels of marijuana; "There is
substantial authority to support the
conclusion that even under [the] more
demanding [compelling interest]
standard, courts have properly
refused to allow exceptions for
marijuana use." "In light of this
impressive amount of legislative and
judicial reasoning, we conclude that
the government has a proper and
compelling interest in forbidding the
use of marijuana."
Orthodox Jewish community's
successful free exercise challenge to
the town's prohibition against posting
lechis on telephone poles to create
eruvs even though the town allowed
secular and church postings

Accepted
Forbidding the use of
marijuana and demanding
that a convict on parole
abstain from marijuana use

United States v.
Hardman, 297 F.3d
1116, 1128 (10th
Cir. 2002)
Davey v. Locke, 299
F.3d 748, 159-60
(9th Cir. 2002)

Native American's possession of
eagle feathers

Gibson v.

Denial of Native American's permit

Denial of student's scholarship once
granting organization found out
student would major in theology
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Rejected
(1) Avoiding violation of
the Establishment Clause
by preventing religious
postings-but not secular
ones-on telephones
(2) Keeping the town's
telephone poles free from
posting
Accepted
Preserving the species of
the bald eagle, a national
symbol
Rejected
Avoiding conflict with
state constitutional
constraint against applying
money to religious
instruction
Accepted
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Babbitt,223 F.3d
1256, 1258 (1 th
Cir. 2000)

to capture bald eagles

Strout v.
Albanese, 178 F.3d
57, 61 (1 st Cir.
1999)

State funding grants only to nonsectarian schools

In re Grand Jury
Empanelling of the
Special Grand
Jury, 171 F.3d 826,
832 (3rd Cir. 1999)
Adams v. Comm'r,

Compelled grand jury testimony of
two religious sisters called to testify
against their father, a rabbi, being
investigated for accused white collar
crimes
Government mandated that Quaker

Adhering to federal
government's treaty
obligations with federally
recognized Indian tribes
Accepted (dicta)
Avoiding an Establishment
Clause violation requires
that the statute exclude
sectarian schools from the
tuition program
Accepted
Investigating and
prosecuting crimes, by
taking grand jury
testimony of witnesses
Accepted

170 F.3d 173, 178

had to pay into the tax system despite

Uniform and mandatory

(3rd Cir. 1999)

the fact portions of taxes go to war
efforts

Besh v. Campbell,
No. 96-5781, 1997
U.S. App. LEXIS
17417 (6th Cir.
1997)
Diaz v. Collins, 114
F.3d 69, 73 (5th Cir.
1997)

Prison prohibited Native Americans
from participating in religious
ceremonies (sweat lodge, burning of
sacred herbs)

Craddick v.
Duckworth, 113
F.3d 83, 85 (7th Cir.
1997)

Native American inmate prohibited
from wearing a medicine bag

May v. Baldwin,
109 F.3d 557, 563
(9th Cir. 1997)
United States v.
Hugs, 109 F.3d
1375, 1378 (9th Cir.
1997)
Arguello v.
Duckworth, No. 951222, 1997 U.S.
App. LEXIS 445
(7th Cir. Jan. 9,
1997)
Stefanow v.

Rastafarian prisoner given solitary
confinement for not loosening his
dreadlocks
Native Americans convicted of
hunting bald eagles

participation in the Federal
income tax system,
irrespective of religious
belief
Accepted
Prison security, uniformity
of prison procedures, or
conservation of scarce
prison resources
Accepted
Prison security; not
allowing inmates to hide
weapons in their hair
Reiected
Interest in not having
medicine bags over a
certain size in prison
(compelling interest test
combined with least
restrictive means test into
one inquiry)
Accepted
Internal security in prisons

Aztec inmate made to cut his hair

Accepted
Protection of bald eagles

Native American prisoners prohibited
from carrying religiously significant
artifacts

Accepted
Prison security

Aryan Nation prisoner prohibited

Accepted
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McFadden, 103 F.3d
1466, 1472 (9th Cir.
1996)
Small v. Lehman, 98
F.3d 762, 768 (3rd
Cir. 1996)
Goehring v. Brophy,
94 F.3d 1294, 1300
(9th Cir. 1996)
(overruled post-O
Centro)
Sasnett v. Sullivan,
91 F.3d 1018, 1023
(7th Cir. 1996)
United States v.
Crystal Evangelical
Free Church (In re
Young), 82 F.3d
1407, 1420 (8th Cir.
1996)
Fawaad v. Jones, 81
F.3d 1084, 1087
(1 th Cir. 1996)
Mack v. O'Leary, 80
F.3d 1175, 1180 (7th
Cir. 1996)
Jolly v. Coughlin, 76
F.3d 468, 479-80
(2nd Cir. 1996)

COMPELLING THE COURTS
from having book

Prison security

Sunni Muslim inmates forbidden
from having separate services

Accepted
Operating an efficient and
cost-effective penal system
Accepted
Health and well being of
University's students

School compelled all students pay
into health plan despite the fact that
some of the money went to student
abortions
Prison prohibited inmates from
wearing crucifixes

Accepted (dicta)
Prison security

Bankruptcy court compelled
members of the Crystal Evangelical
Free Church to hand over their tithes
as part of a bankruptcy judgment

Reiected
Advancing the bankruptcy
system

Prison compelled Muslim inmates to
use given names and Muslim names
on their mail
Prison prohibited accommodations
for a prisoner during Ramadan and
for a religious banquet
Rastafarian prisoner's successful
challenge to solitary confinement for
not submitting to tuberculosis blood
test

Accepted
Efficient identification
system in prison
Accepted (dicta)
Prison security

Hamilton v. Sehriro,
74 F.3d 1545, 1557
(8th Cir. 1996)
Hartmann v. Stone,
68 F.3d 973, 985-86
(6th Cir. 1995)

Prison prohibited Native American
inmates from participating in sweat
lodge
Army families' successful challenge
to day care providers' prohibition
against religious practices

Cheema v.
Thompson, 67 F.3d
883, 885-86 (9th
Cir. 1995)

School district's prohibition against
Khalsa Sikh children's wearing a
kirpan (religious sword) to school

American Life
League v. Reno, 47

Unsuccessful challenge to the Access
Act, which prohibited abortion
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Accepted (dicta)
Keeping prisoners and
prison staff free from
infection (government
failed least restrictive
means test)
Accepted
Prison safety
Accepted (dicta)
Army's interest in
preventing entanglement
with religion (government
lost because its
entanglement claim was
not legitimate)
Accepted (dicta)
Campus safety (school
district lost based on lack
of developing a record as
to why the district court's
injunction would fail to
achieve the school's
compelling interest)
Accepted
(1) Protecting public health
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F.3d 642, 645 (4th
Cir. 1995)

protestors from preventing those
seeking abortions from accessing
clinics

Church of
Scientology Flag
Serv. v. City of
Clearwater, 2 F.3d
1514, 1544 (11 th
Cir. 1993)
Grand Jury
Proceedings of Doe
v. United States, 842
F.2d 244, 247-48
(10th Cir. 1988)
Dayton Christian
Sch. v. Ohio Civil
Rights Comm'n, 766
F.2d 932, 953 (6th
Cir. 1985)

City ordinance prohibited some of the
Church of Scientology Flag Service
Organization's fund-raising

Mormon child held in contempt for
refusing to testify against his parents
in a criminal investigation

Religious school's challenge to
plaintiff's employment discrimination
suit for not renewing her contract to
teach because she was pregnant

Callahan v. Woods,
736 F.2d 1269,
1274-75 (9th Cir.
1984)
United States
Jaycees v. McClure,
709 F.2d 1560, 1561
(8th Cir. 1983)

Government compelled religious
plaintiffs child to register for a social
security number despite father's
belief it was the mark of the beast
Jaycees refusal to admit women to
membership; Jaycees' right to
association prevails

United States v.
Dickens, 695 F.2d
765, 772-73 (3rd
Cir. 1982)

District court chose not to question
each prospective juror on their
opinions of Black Muslims, and
chose not to instruct jurors that

[Vol. XIV:2

by promoting unobstructed
access to reproductive
health facilities
(2) Protecting public safety
by preventing violent
activity aimed at patients
of reproductive health
centers
Accepted
Protecting church members
from affirmative, material
misrepresentations
designed to part them from
their money
Accepted
Investigating offenses
against the criminal laws
of the United States
Accepted
Eliminating discrimination
in distributing publicly
available goods and
services (government
failed least restrictive
means test)
Accepted
Ensuring the efficient
functioning of nationwide
social welfare system
Rejected
Government's right to rid
places of public
accommodation of sex
discrimination
Accepted
Enforcing its criminal
laws, here RICO, and
vindicating violations

religion was irrelevant to guilt
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COMPELLING THE COURTS
APPENDIX II: COMPELLING INTEREST CASES 10 4 AFTER 0 CENTRO

SECOND CIRCUIT
Westchester Day Sch. v.
Vill. of Mamaroneck, 504
F.3d 338, 353 (2d Cir.
2007)

Jewish private school's
successful RLUIPA challenge
to town's denial of expansion
permit

Reiected**
(1) Enforce zoning
(2) Safety through traffic
regulation
** Notably, the same court

Hankins v. N.Y. Annual
Conference of the United
Methodist Church, 516 F.
Supp. 2d 225, 237
(E.D.N.Y 2007)

Redhead v. Conference
of Seventh-day
Adventists, 440 F. Supp.
2d 211, 220-23
(E.D.N.Y. 2006)
Ragland v. Angelone,
420 F. Supp. 2d 507,
515-17 (D. Va. 2006)

Methodist reverend's
unsuccessful Age
Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA)
challenge to church's policy
of mandatory retirement at
seventy
Pregnant, non-married teacher
at a Seventh-day Adventist
school survives summary
judgment on her Title VII
claim for discriminatory firing
Inmate's unsuccessful
RLUIPA challenge to prison's
policy, forcing him to cut his
long beard and hair, grown for
religious reasons

did not reject (or accept)
these compelling interests in
its earlier holding (supra).
Rejected
Enforcement of the Age
Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA)

Accepted
Enforcement of Title VII as
to employment claims that do
not implicate the First
Amendment
Accepted
(1) Penal interests in security,
staff safety, inmate
identification, and inmate
health
(2) Uniform enforcement of
grooming policy across
general prison population

SEVENTH CIRCUIT
Borzych v. Frank, 439
F.3d 388, 390-91 (7th
Cir. 2006)

White Supremacist inmate's
unsuccessful RLUIPA
challenge to prison's removal

Accepted
Interest in curtailing prison
violence

104. For the purposes of this Appendix, "compelling interest cases" are cases in which the court
reached the merits of the government's compelling interest argument after finding that the plaintiff
successfully made out its prima facie case that the government's action placed a substantial
burden on the plaintiffs religious freedom. Therefore, the reader will note that a number of cases
decided after 0 Centro have cited it, and indeed, followed it, on grounds other than its compelling
interest analysis. These cases are outside the scope of this Article.
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of Odinist (secular books
promoting racism) Odinist
books from the prison library
EIGHTH CIRCUIT
United States v. Bertucci,
No. 8:09CR84, 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 119230 at
*23-25(D. Neb. Nov. 5,
2009)

Native American charged
with killing bald eagle

Accepted
Preserving the eagle
population

NINTH CIRCUIT
Church of the Holy Light
of the Queen v. Mukasey,
615 F. Supp. 2d 1210,
1220-21 (D. Or. 2009)

United States v.
Adeyemo, 624 F. Supp.
2d 1081, 1094 (N.D. Cal.
2008)

Walls v. Schriro, No. 052259, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14539, at *17-18
(D. Ariz. Feb. 25, 2008)

Navajo Nation v. United
States Forest Serv's, 535
F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2008)

http://scholarship.richmond.edu/pilr/vol14/iss2/3

Santo Daime spiritual leader's
successful RFRA challenge to
his arrest for importing and
drinking Daime tea, made
with a Brazilian narcotic,
about which there is "no
question [that it] could be
dangerous if used
improperly," and which is
prohibited under the
Controlled Substance Act
Santeria worshipper's
unsuccessful RFRA challenge
to his conviction for
unlawfully importing leopard
skins (endangered species)
without a permit
(distinguishing 0 Centro)
RLUIPA Claim 1 - Diet
Hare Krishna inmate survives
summary judgment on his
RLUIPA claim that the
prison's denial of his right to
food prepared only by
members of his own faith
burdened his religious
practice
RLUIPA Claim 2 - Groomin2
Inmate survives summary
judgment on claim that the
prison's grooming policy
burdens his religious practice
by forcing to cut the long lock
of hair at the base of his skull
Native American plaintiffs
who worshipped mountain
range used for recreational
skiing had no RFRA claim
because the government's use

Rejected
(1) Health of plaintiffs
(2) Health of others who
drink Daime tea
(3) Preventing diversion of
(4) Daime tea to nonreligious users
(5) Integrity of DEA's ability
to regulate the use of
controlled substances
Accepted
Conservation of endangered
leopards

Rejected (insufficient
evidence)
(1) Prison's ability to
maintain order and security
with its available resources
(2) Based on availability of
resources

Rejected (insufficient
evidence)
(1) Maintaining uniformity
among inmates
(2) Good order and discipline
(3) Improving inmate
identification
Didn't Reach
No substantial burden
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United States v. Lepp,
No. CR 04-0317, 2007
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66311
at *9-11 (N.D. Cal. Sept.
6, 2007)

COMPELLING THE COURTS
of water containing a small
percentage of human waste
did not substantially burden
plaintiff's free exercise of
religion
Denial of Rastafarian's
motion to suppress fruits of
search warrant on RFRA
grounds

Accepted
Enforcing drug laws by
executing valid search
warrants in pursuit of that
aim

TENTH CIRCUIT
United States v. Friday,
525 F.3d 938, 955-56
(10th Cir. 2008)

Northern Arapaho Tribe
member's unsuccessful RFRA
challenge to his prosecution
for shooting a bald eagle
without a permit (the permit
system itself, already a
religious exemption)

Rocky Mountain
Christian Church v. Bd.
of County Comm'rs of
Boulder County,
Colorado, 612 F. Supp.
2d 1163, 1168-69 (D.
Colo. 2009)

Rocky Mountain Christian
Church's RLUIPA claim
challenging Boulder County's
denial of a permit to expand
the size of its church

Accepted (Enforcement of
pre-existing religious
exemption)
The permit system allows the
government to:
(1) Keep track of which
eagles have been legally
taken and by whom
(2) Influence the number of
eagles taken
(3) Ensure, in the event of a
shortage, that no one tribe is
getting a disproportionate
portion of bald eagles
Rejected
(1) Lack of harmony with the
character of the
neighborhood, the
surrounding area, and the
county's comprehensive plan
limiting intensive
development
(2) Agricultural designation
of the surrounding land
(3) Depletion of natural
resources

D.C. CIRCUIT
Jefferson v. Lappin, No.
06-5219, 2006 U.S. App.
LEXIS 31931, at *3
(D.C. Cir. Dec. 26, 2006)

Sample v. Lappin, 479 F.
Supp. 2d 120, 124-25
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Muslim inmate's unsuccessful
RFRA challenge that the
prison's allowance of kufis
(tight, rounded caps) after
banning turbans was not, in
fact, the least restrictive
means of achieving the
government's compelling
interest
Orthodox Jewish inmate's
unsuccessful RFRA challenge

Accepted
Maintaining prison security

Accepted
Maintaining prison security
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to the prison's policy,
forbidding inmates from
having wine during the
Sabbath

APPENDIX III: RAW DATA

Total Cases Surveyed
Accepted Compelling Interest
Rejected Compelling Interest
Percentage Accepted
Percentage Rejected
Accepted Compelling Interest
(prison)
Rejected Compelling Interest
(prison)
Percentage Accepted
Percentage Rejected
Accepted Compelling Interest
(non-prison)
Rejected Compelling Interest
(non-prison)
Percentage Accepted
Percentage Rejected

http://scholarship.richmond.edu/pilr/vol14/iss2/3

96

34

37
8 (one "neutral")
80.40%
17.40%

9
5
64.30%
35.70%

18

4

1
94.70%
5.30%

1
80%
20%

7 (one "neutral")
70.40%
25.90%

4
50%
50%

30

